Ce document est publié dans l' intention de rendre accessible les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l' unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims to encourage discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners. The paper examines a data set of 338 randomly selected financial reorganization plans filed in Canada during the period 1978-87. Creditors reject roughly 25% of reorganization plans, while about 20% of the plans creditors accept fail before completion, providing evidence of filtering failure in the reorganization process. A logit model of the creditors reorganization decision produces two interesting results. Plans offering a high proportion of cash payments are more likely to be accepted by creditors, which we interpret as evidence that cash is a signal of financial viability. Plans with high ratios of secured debt are more likely to be accepted, which we interpret as evidence that secured creditors with insider knowledge signal information about the financial viability of firms to unsecured creditors.
Introduction
Bankruptcy laws in most countries, including the U.S., give creditors an important role in the bankruptcy decision of an insolvent rm. Several recent papers focus on con icts arising in reorganization and on the importance of bargaining on the outcome of nancial distress. Brown 1989 , Giammarino 1989 , Bebchuk and Chang 1992 , Gilson, John, and Lang 1990 , Gertner and Scharfstein 1991 , White 1994 , and Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein 1994 examine how con icts between the rm and its creditors and between groups of creditors are resolved through bargaining. Data support the notion that creditors play a k ey role in bankruptcy: roughly 90 percent of reorganization plans are not con rmed in the U.S. Flynn, 1989 and, in Canada, about 25 percent of reorganization plans are rejected by creditors Fisher and Martel, 1994b; Martel, 1994. This article presents empirical evidence on the role of creditors in nancial reorganization. There are few empirical studies on court-supervised bankruptcy and nancial reorganization. Excepting Flynn 1989 , the studies have t w o common features: a small number of observations and nonrandom samples. Casey, McGee, and Stickney 1986 and Franks and Torous 1989 examine only successful Chapter 11 cases, which is clearly not representative of all rms attempting reorganization. The White 1981 White , 1984 and the LoPucki 1983 studies are con ned to isolated geographical areas and, as such, their data may not be representative of all U.S. rms going through Ch. 11.
This study di ers from previous ones in two important w a ys. First, this article focuses on the behavior of creditors rather than rms. Reorganization is a t w o-stage process. At stage 1, the rm chooses between liquidation and reorganization. At stage 2, unsecured creditors vote whether to allow reorganizing rms to proceed. In our data, stage 1 has already happened; we examine the determinants of the creditors' stage 2 decision. Second, this study employs a unique and rich data set not previously available to researchers. Our sample includes 338 reorganization plans covering the years 1978 to 1987 provided by the Bankruptcy Branch of the Canadian Department of Industry and Science isc, the federal government department responsible for the administration of Canadian bankruptcy law. Major advantages of the data are: i they are randomly selected from the population of commercial reorganization plans led in Canada, ii they are representative of accepted and rejected reorganization plans, and iii there is a relatively large number of events to be analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares Canadian with American bankruptcy law. Although there are di erences in bankruptcy law b e t w een the two countries, there are enough similarities|in particular the role of unsecured creditors|such that Canadian data can yield important insights into the bankruptcy process in general. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents key facts from the data. We nd evidence that creditors vote according to whether their expected return is higher in liquidation or reorganization.
In addition, we nd that the proportion of cash payments o ered to creditors is signi cantly higher for rms which successfully reorganize compared to those which fail. Section 5 discusses results from logit estimation of the incidence of acceptance of reorganization plans by unsecured creditors. Two i n teresting results emerge from the analysis. First, reorganization plans o ering relatively more cash are more likely to be approved by creditors, which w e i n terpret as evidence that cash is a signal of nancial viability. Second, plans with higher ratios of secured debt are more likely to be accepted, which w e i n terpret as evidence that secured creditors with insider knowledge signal information about the nancial viability of rms to unsecured creditors. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
Background to Canadian Bankruptcy Law
Before discussing the data, methodology, and results, it is worthwhile to compare the Canadian Bankruptcy Act with the American Bankruptcy Code. 1 The basics of bankruptcy are very similar in the two countries. An insolvent rm seeking the protection of bankruptcy law in Canada has two options: liquidation Chapter 7 in the U.S. or reorganization Chapter 11 in the U.S.. A rm choosing reorganization submits a plan to its creditors. The fate of the plan is decided at a meeting of the creditors. Provided that i a majority of unsecured creditors present at the meeting vote in favor of the plan, and ii the claims of unsecured creditors voting in favor of the plan represent at least 75 percent o f the total claims of the unsecured creditors at the meeting, the plan is deemed to be accepted.
There are two k ey di erences between the bankruptcy laws in the two countries. First, unlike U.S. bankruptcy law, secured creditors are not bound by the Bankruptcy Act in Canada. A secured creditor in Canada is not subject to a stay and has the option of liquidating the assets of a debtor in arrears at any time during reorganization. Given that secured creditors are not constrained by the Bankruptcy Act, one would expect any negative in uence on the reorganization process by secured creditors, if it exists, to show up clearly in Canadian data. Second, Canadian law has nothing similar to the`cramdown' procedure that exists in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The cramdown procedure typically results in prolonged court proceedings involving competing testimony b y expert witnesses, valuation of a rm's assets by outside appraisers, etc. The courts are much less likely to become involved in bankruptcy proceedings in Canada, raising the hope that economic fundamentals, rather than legal maneuvering, ultimately determine the outcome of the bankruptcy process.
Data
Each reorganization plan made under the Bankruptcy Act is led with one of the 15 regional bankruptcy o ces of isc. The data used in the present study are taken from these les. 2 We limit attention to the approximately 1,985 commercial reorganization plans led at the largest o ces in each o f v e regions of the country Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver during the period 1978 87. 3 Using a master-list of le-numbers kept by isc, a random sample of 499 plans is selected from the 1,985. 4 The sample is chosen to be`balanced', i.e., the sample is representative of the regional distribution of plans led each y ear over the sample period. Because the study focuses on commercial reorganization plans, consumer plans are omitted from the sample, reducing the sample by 55 plans to 444. 5 Owing to insu cient data and missing or incomplete les a further 106 les are deleted from the sample. The nal sample has 338 les, of which 241 were o cially closed and 97 were still active when the data were collected.
Preliminary Analysis
In view of the scarcity of representative data on rms going through nancial reorganization, we believe there is some value added in presenting stylized facts from the data. It is worth stressing that these facts originate from the data and not from casual observation or discussion with bankruptcy practitioners, which is the approach used by many other studies of bankruptcy. Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics for the data. Firms attempting reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act are fairly small, with average assets of $2.4 million and average liabilities of $4.0 million. 6 Only 13 of the rms in the sample have publicly traded shares; the remaining 325 rms are privately owned. As might be expected with nancial data, the variables are highly skewed. For example, while the mean value of assets is $2.4 million, over 74 percent of the rms in the sample have total assets of less than $1 million. Summary statistics for reorganization plans are listed under`Contract variables'. Reorganizing rms o er an average of 44 cents on the dollar to ordinary creditors and have a liquidation value of 29 cents on the dollar. 7 Given the payment to creditors in the plan, on average, 14 percent is paid in cash up-front, 82 percent in cash installments, and 3 percent in equity. 8 On average, the representative rm has 2.6 secured creditors, 80.4 ordinary unsecured creditors, and 13.6 preferred unsecured creditors. 9 About 40 percent of the plans had at least one amendment but no plan has more than three amendments. The average amount of time between submission of the plan and the creditors' vote is 52.5 days; 90 percent of the plans were voted on within 3 months of submission.
For the sample as a whole, unsecured creditors accept 259 of the 338 reorganization plans, representing an acceptance rate of 77 percent. Acceptance of a plan is no guarantee that the rm will complete reorganization: of the 182 closed les that are accepted by creditors, 34 enter bankruptcy before the terms of the plan are completed, representing a default rate of 19 percent. In fact, for the 241 closed les, the 59 rejected plans and the 34 defaulted plans imply that 148 plans successfully complete the reorganization process. Therefore, the ex ante probability that a rm entering the reorganization process will emerge as an ongoing enterprise is about 61 percent. Two features of reorganization are thus apparent. First, the rejection rate of 23 percent implies unsecured creditors do not automatically approve the reorganization of insolvent rms. Second, the default rate of 19 percent indicates there is signi cant uncertainty whether reorganizing rms will actually pay o their creditors.
If the rm is a viable enterprise, then creditors make the correct decision if they vote to accept a plan from the rm and a Type I error if they vote to reject the plan. If the rm is not viable, then creditors make the correct decision if they vote to reject a plan from the rm and a Type II error if they vote to accept the plan. Of the 182 rms with accepted plans, 34 subsequently enter liquidation, implying that creditors commit a Type II error in 34 cases. It is not possible to determine the number of cases where a Type I error is committed, because it cannot be determined from the data which of the rejected plans were made by viable rms. However, the possible incidence of Type I errors can be determined given di erent levels of the incidence of Type II errors together with the fact that 59 plans are rejected. Table 2 presents possible scenarios for the incidence of Type I and Type II errors. 10 Table 2 shows that the incidence of 7 Gross liquidation value is de ned as total assets minus secured and preferred claims. The liquidation value is the gross liquidation value divided by ordinary claims.
8 Up-front p a yments are de ned as cash paid within one month of the date the bankruptcy court approves the plan. Installments are de ned as cash payments more than one month after the court approval date.
9 Preferred creditors have roughly the same status as`priority' creditors under the American Bankruptcy Code. Examples of preferred creditors are federal and provincial governments, employees, and landlords.
10 Table 2 is determined as follows. If all 59 rejected plans are from nonviable rms, i.e., creditors always make the correct rejection decision, then the incidence of Type I errors is zero and the incidence of Type II errors is 34=34 + 59 :366, giving the rst row. If 57 of Type II errors is no less than 36 percent, and is at least four times the incidence of Type I errors at con dence levels of 5 percent or 10 percent for the creditors' decision. According to White 1994` ltering failure' occurs in the bankruptcy process when Type I and II errors are committed by creditors. The overall incidence of ltering failure in the data is between 14.0 percent 34 241 and 38.6 percent 93 241.
Another important set of stylized facts about the reorganization process concerns the type of contract o ered by rms to their creditors. According to White 1994, rms use the reorganization payo rate to signal nancial viability to creditors. Martel 1994 assumes that the probability of successful reorganization depends positively on the amount of cash available at the time of reorganization. Because reorganizing rms are typically cash constrained and face credit rationing from the bank, less viable rms will have more di culty raising cash to compensate creditors. Assuming there is asymmetric information with respect to the rm's nancial viability, rms can use cash payments to signal their type to uninformed creditors. In equilibrium, cash payments are used by viable rms to separate themselves from non-viable rms. Martel 1994 also shows that the expected liquidation return, which represents the opportunity cost of reorganization to creditors, a ects the creditors' decision. Table 3 sheds some light on the role of the reorganization return, cash payments, and the liquidation return. Table 3 displays three potentially important facts. First, the liquidation payo rate exceeds the reorganization payo rate for rejected plans and vice versa for accepted plans. 11 Second, accepted plans have higher reorganization payo rates than rejected plans. 12 These facts are consistent with creditors voting according to whether the expected payo rate is greater under reorganization or liquidation. Third, looking only at accepted plans, cash payments for successful, i.e., completed, plans are more than seven times higher than cash payments for plans that defaulted. 13 This is consistent with high cash payments signalling rms that are more likely to reorganize successfully. Signalling is also supported by the fact that the reorganization payo rate for accepted-completed plans is lower than the payo rate for accepted-defaulted plans. Creditors were willing to accept a lower payo rate from accepted-completed plans because the higher cash payments signalled a higher probability that these plans would actually the 59 rejected plans were from nonviable rms, then 2 rejected plans were made by viable rms, the incidence of Type I errors is 2=2+ 148 :013 and the incidence of Type II errors is 34=34 + 57 :374, giving the second row. The rest of the table is determined the same way.
11 A t-test of the hypothesis that the mean liquidation payo rate is greater less than the mean reorganization p a y o rate has critical value of 0.16 4.74 and a p-value of 0.44 2:27 10 ,6 for rejected accepted plans.
12 A t-test of the hypothesis that the mean reorganization payo rate is greater for accepted plans than it is for rejected plans has critical value of 1.11 and a p-value of 0.14.
13 A t-test of the hypothesis that the mean cash payo rate is greater for completed plans than for defaulted plans has critical value of 5.24 and a p-value of 3:16 10 ,6 .
succeed.
To summarize, First, the existence of ltering failure indicates that creditors face signi cant uncertainty when deciding whether to allow rms to proceed with reorganization. Second, the data suggest that reorganization depends on the payo rate creditors expect to receive in reorganization versus liquidation. Third, the nature of the reorganization contract, in particular the amount o f cash payments made to creditors, also seems to play a role in the process.
Parametric Analysis of Creditor Voting
By voting to reject roughly one-quarter of reorganization plans, unsecured creditors clearly play a critical role in bankruptcy reorganization. But what factors in uence how creditors vote? Preliminary analysis suggests that reorganization and liquidation payo rates to unsecured creditors are probably important determinants of the creditors' decision. To i n v estigate whether this is the case, we estimate the impact of payo rates on the outcome of the unsecured creditors vote whether to approve a reorganization plan. Other questions about reorganization can also be analyzed within this framework. For example, we m a y investigate the impact of secured creditors, the impact of legal restrictions, and the impact of bargaining between debtor and creditors.
Model speci cation
The dependent v ariable takes only the discrete values of unity if the plan is accepted by the creditors and zero otherwise. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent v ariable, the acceptance incidence equation is estimated by logit analysis. 14 Strictly speaking, the vote represents the joint e ect of many individual decisions. For tractability, w e assume that creditors act as a coalition.
Following the preliminary analysis, assume that creditors compare the expected payo rate from the reorganization plan to the expected payo rate from liquidation and vote for the option with the higher payo rate. Preliminary analysis also suggested that the amount of cash the rm o ers as part of the plan may be an important element of the creditors' decision. Thus, the contract variables|the reorganization payo rate, the liquidation payo rate, and the ratio of cash payments to total payments|model the impact of the plan on the outcome of the unsecured creditors vote.
Theoretical models of bankruptcy Bulow and Shoven, 1978; White, 1981 White, , 1989 assume that secured creditors favor liquidation over reorganization. Furthermore, in Canada, secured creditors have the power to terminate reorganization because they are not constrained by bankruptcy law. Clearly, an important issue facing unsecured creditors is whether secured creditors will choose to exercise their power over a rm attempting reorganization. One possibility is that rms with relatively high levels of secured debt may be more at risk from liquidation by secured creditors. To determine the in uence of secured creditors on the vote by unsecured creditors, the ratio of secured claims to total liabilities is added to the logit model.
According to White 1981 insolvent rms with large numbers of ordinary creditors are much more likely to reorganize than insolvent rms with a small number of ordinary creditors. The existence of extreme values in the sample makes it problematic to implement empirically a variable capturing this e ect. To mitigate the impact of extreme values we use the ratio of ordinary creditors to the total number of creditors as an explanatory variable.
Full repayment of preferred claims is mandatory for the approval of nancial reorganization in Canada. The mandatory repayment of preferred claims may impose a burden on the cash-ow of reorganizing rms. In addition, federal and provincial government, or Crown, claims, which are almost always the largest component of preferred claims, 15 are viewed by many bankruptcy practitioners to be a signi cant impediment to reorganization. To control for this e ect, the ratio of Crown claims to total liabilities is added to the model. An e ciency concern about the bankruptcy process is it allows unpro table rms to`buy time' and extend their lives at the expense of their creditors. To examine the e ect of delays, the time between ling and voting is added to the list of explanatory variables. As a proxy for willingness to negotiate on the part of the debtor, we a d d a v ariable measuring the number of amendments to the plan. To control for the in uence of the business cycle, the change in unemployment rate over the quarter before the date of the creditors' vote is also added to the model. We also control for the following xed e ects: a dummy variable for corporations|to control for di erences between corporate plans and those made by individuals|4 regional dummy v ariables Toronto is the excluded region, 10 year dummy v ariables, and 4 industry dummy v ariables.
Owing to incomplete information, 55 so-called holding plans are deleted from the sample reducing the sample size to 283 plans for the logit analysis. Holding plans are submitted by rms requiring more time to prepare complete proposals. Because they are essentially interim documents, important data for the logit analysis|such as the distribution of claims against the rm and information about payo rates to creditors|are frequently missing from holding plans. 16 The data set is generated by rms that have c hosen reorganization over liquidation, raising the possibility that estimates are subject to self-selection bias. 17 15 Crown claims account for the majority of preferred claims in 82 percent of the plans with preferred claims. 16 In cases where the payo rate and the proportion of cash payments are unknown they have been set to zero on the grounds that creditors assume the worst in the absence of information to the contrary. 17 Of course, preceding the bankruptcy decision, there is another type of self-selection when In principle, it is possible to correct for the selectivity bias given data on the variables that determine rms' choice between liquidation and reorganization. However, given the absence of an accepted theoretical model of the bankruptcy decision and, in any case, the likelihood that our data do not cover all the relevant v ariables, we do not control for self-selection bias in the estimates below. Table 4 contains the results from logit estimation. The three key variables modeling the creditors decision are individually signi cant at the .05 level. A higher liquidation payo rate implies a lower acceptance rate, a higher reorganization payo rate implies a higher acceptance rate, and a higher proportion of cash payments implies a higher acceptance rate, ceteris paribus. These results con rm the story in Table 3 . As expected, the reorganization payo rate is important. The type of contract o ered to creditors also plays a key role in reorganization, supporting the hypothesis that asymmetric information induces rms to use cash payments to signal their viability to uninformed creditors. With symmetric information, the rm's investment decision is independent o f its choice of nancing Modigliani and Miller, 1958 , implying than an insolvent rm is indi erent b e t w een cash and deferred payments. The cash payments result indicates that the rm's reorganization decision is not independent o f its nancing decision. This is consistent with Myers and Majluf 1984 where asymmetric information a ects the type of nancing used by rms and induces à pecking order' in the sources of nancing such that rms resort rst to internal nancing, then to low-risk debt, and nally to equity. 18 Plans made by rms with a relatively large amount of secured claims are signi cantly more likely to be accepted. This apparently contradicts the view that secured creditors hinder reorganization. According to Gilson, John, and Lang 1990 , private reorganization is more likely to succeed in rms owing relatively more debt to banks because the holdout problem is mitigated. Our result also indicates that reorganization is more likely to succeed in rms with relatively more bank debt but it probably is related to the veto power that secured creditors enjoy under Canadian bankruptcy law. It is well known in common value auctions that bidders can update their valuations by observing the actions of other bidders. In the context of reorganization, unsecured creditors may w atch the behavior of secured creditors when evaluating the prospects of a reorganizing rm. A decision by a secured creditor to support a plan, by not liquidating its assets in the rm, may t h us be interpreted by unsecured creditors as a signal to support the plan. This e ect will only be reinforced if it is known insolvent rms choose to resolve their nancial di culties under the protection of bankruptcy law rather than trying an informal arrangement.
Estimation results
18 See Harris and Raviv 1991 for a survey of the literature on how asymmetric information a ects the nancing decisions of rms.
that secured creditors have inside information about the rm. 19 In fact, Fama 1985 argues that banks play an important role as transmitters of information in capital markets because of their access to private information about rms arising from ongoing business relationships. In support of Fama 1985 , James 1987 nds that banks provide a service with their lending activity that is not available from other types of lenders and Lummer and McConnell 1989 nd that favorable loan revisions by banks result in signi cantly positive excess stock returns for borrowers around the loan announcement.
Plans made by rms with a relatively large number of ordinary creditors are signi cantly more likely to be accepted. This result seems paradoxical since one would expect that higher numbers of ordinary creditors make agreement on a plan more di cult, everything else being equal. Below, we i n v estigate the possibility that the signalling e ect of the size of secured claims is related to the relative n umber of ordinary creditors.
Plans with relatively large Crown claims are less likely to be accepted, which is consistent with the view that the statutory nature of Crown claims hinders successful reorganization by raising the burden on the rm's cash ow. The e ect is statistically signi cant at the .10 level.
The more time between ling and voting, the lower the probability that unsecured creditors vote in favor of the plan. The time spent in reorganization is costly because it disrupts the rm's normal activities. Clearly, the opportunity cost of time is higher to viable rms. Thus, delays may convey information to creditors about the rm's viability. This suggests that rms attempting to`buy time' will be unsuccessful. Another explanation is that in some cases agreement is hard to reach, leading to delays and eventually rejection. Note, however, that the logit regression controls for the presence of bargaining through the number of amendments variable. The more amendments to the plan, the more likely the plan is accepted. Thus, rms that take a long time to reorganize and do not bargain with their creditors, as represented by the amendments variable, are much less likely to have plans accepted, which is consistent with the`buy time' argument.
Because the unemployment rate variable has a negative and insigni cant coe cient, there is weak evidence that acceptance probabilities are procyclical. 20 Corporate plans are not estimated to have signi cantly di erent acceptance probabilities than non-corporate plans.
To give an idea of the robustness of the results, Table 5 presents results from alternative speci cations of the model. Column 1 reproduces the results from Table 4 for comparison. A likelihood ratio test to determine the joint signi cance of the contract variables clearly rejects the hypothesis that the characteristics of the reorganization plan have no e ect on the probability that the plan is accepted by creditors. The column 2 estimates replace the Crown claims variable with the ratio of preferred claims to total liabilities. The other coe cients hardly change and the coe cient on the preferred claims variable is not statistically signi cant. Thus, there is weak evidence that it is Crown claims and not preferred claims, of which Crown claims are a subset, that have a negative impact on the acceptance rate.
Column 3 investigates the secured claims signalling story. Small creditors have little incentive to gather information on the future viability of the rm. Thus, rms with large numbers of ordinary creditors will probably have relatively low n umbers of informed creditors, implying that the signalling e ect of secured claims will be that much more pronounced. To i n v estigate this possibility, the ordinary creditor and secured claims variables are replaced by a n interaction term, which is simply the product of the two v ariables. 21 The higher the value of the interaction term, the greater the potential for secured claims to act as signal because it represents cases where secured claims are relatively high and ordinary creditors are a relatively large group. The coe cient on the interaction term is statistically signi cant at the .10 level and positive, which is consistent with the signalling story. Note also that the coe cients on the contract variables are largely una ected by the change in speci cation.
Column 4 shows the estimates when the control variables for year, region, and industry are deleted from the list of explanatory variables. The pseudo-R 2 falls by almost 30 percent from the base model, indicating that a fair degree of the` t' in the model is due to the control variables. Nonetheless, the signi cance of the other variables in the model is not appreciably altered. In particular, joint insigni cance of the contract variables is easily rejected at conventional levels of signi cance, echoing other results in the table.
Conclusion
The paper has presented a unique data set on rms undergoing nancial reorganization in Canada over the period 1978 87. We h a v e presented ample evidence in this paper showing that there is indeed negotiation between the rm and its creditors after the rm has decided to proceed with reorganization.
What do the results suggest about bankruptcy theory? First, the reorganization process is more complex than the recent model of White 1994 suggests. To be sure, the rate of return o ered to unsecured creditors in a rm's reorganization plan is an important inducement for creditors to favor the plan. But the data also indicate that the liquidation return to unsecured creditors, i.e., the opportunity cost of nancial reorganization to the creditors, is also an important v ariable in the reorganization process. Moreover, the rate of up-front cash 21 The product is multiplied by .01 to give the interaction term a range of zero to 100.
payments by the rm also has a signi cant on the process, supporting the Martel 1994 claim that signalling is an important element of the process. That the nature of the contract itself is an important factor in the reorganization process is a genuinely new empirical nding and warrants further theoretical investigation.
Second, secured creditors seem to play an additional role to that suggested in Bulow and Shoven 1978 and White 1981 . In these models, secured creditors prefer liquidation over reorganization. In our data, however, we nd that unsecured creditors are more likely to favor reorganization in rms which h a v e relatively higher rates of secured debt. One interpretation is that secured creditors play a role in screening viable rms from nonviable rms. Of course, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the Bulow-Shoven-White view. It is quite possible that secured creditors have a negative e ect on the number of rms choosing reorganization while strongly backing a few rms that they would like to see restructured. In other words, to completely understand the a ect of secured creditors on reorganization, one would need to determine the impact of secured creditors on the number of rms choosing reorganization over liquidation. 
